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Chapter 1

Tolerance: An Impossible Virtue?

When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union dissolved, many hoped for a “new
world order,” an order distinguished by significant reduction in internecine
bloodshed. It would be replaced by continued growth of democracy, mutual con
cern, and respect for differences. So far, it has not worked out that way. In the for
mer Yugoslavia, neighbors who once lived in peace, even intermarried—Serbs,
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Kosovar Albanians, and Gypsies—are now at each
other’s throats. Northern Ireland remains bitterly divided between Protestants and
Catholics, internal strife or mutual enmity marks several former Soviet republics,
and large-scale massacres have taken place not only in Rwanda but elsewhere
around the world. There is nothing new in this, only additional instances of con
flict, strife, and hatred. Long before the Berlin Wall went up or came down, peo
ple have found it difficult to live together peacefully, unless coerced into a false
harmony to do so.
Many things create deep divisions. Material interests, such as water rights or
market access, can set people against each other. Cultural animosities sometimes
serve as proxies for these. Demanding protection of a group’s cultural heritage, for
example, seems a less squalid reason for oppression than economic advantage. Be
hind high-minded and sentiment-filled demands, we often find selfish interests.
Those grasping for power have their own self-interested reasons for turning small
differences, disquieting suspicions, and minor irritations into major confrontations.
Still, although all animosities and strife have material consequences, not all
have their roots in material concerns, greed, or narrow self-interest. Appeals to
racial purity, linguistic superiority, cultural traditions, sacred places, and the sa
cred history of the nation continue to create deep divisions. Nor are hostilities
limited to race or religion or to distinct linguistic, cultural, and geographical
groups. Any difference, it seems, can produce hatred between and among peoples.
Hatreds sometimes arise largely, though never simply, because one group cannot
stand what another feels, thinks, or does. Such bitter animosities may so blind
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parties to a dispute that they cannot see that they are jeopardizing both their own
enlightened self-interest and what they hold most dear, as the terrible example of
religious war proves. Opportunistic ideologues are skilled at cynically blowing
on the coals of racial, ethnic, or cultural hatreds to further their own interests.
Once ignited, publics often become so inflamed that they consume even them
selves, often including those whose fanaticism or cynical grab for power initially
lit the match.
Animosity, loathing, and abhorrence reveal themselves not only in atrocities,
though that is common enough. They manifest themselves through sneers, petty
humiliations, discrimination, persecution, and oppression. Each breeds anger and
resentment and a powerful urge to retaliate. This, in turn, adds to greater suspi
cion, fear, distorted thinking, and twisted emotions on all sides. People may con
tinue to be neighbors but not live as neighbors. Although they live next door,
there is nothing neighborly about their relations, as the miles of shiny razor wire
separating Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland attests.
Such hatred and bitterness corrosively eats away at what commonly cements
communities together. Without the mortar of respect, trust, and tolerance, brick
scrapes against brick. The result is familiar. Those locked in enmity yearn not only
to be free from the hated other but to smash them to smithereens. Where those with
power cannot keep the despised completely oppressed, they may yield to the temp
tation to rid themselves of the contemptible altogether, to make them “disappear.”
A curious feature of some deep-seated animosities is that, from the outside,
they often look unfathomable, even faintly ridiculous. From the outside, individ
uals or groups locked in hatred may seem like two peas in a pod. From the inside,
however, the similarities only highlight remaining differences, differences that
come to assume monumental importance. Oddly enough, great differences do not
always breed the same intense animosity as do small ones.
From our present perspective, for example, the antagonism among various
Protestant denominations in seventeenth-century England seems incredible.
Surely, we think, it was mad to let such seemingly minor doctrinal differences
matter so much. Is it really worth fighting over whether one is baptized as an in
fant or an adult? Yet we also know that, at the time, differences such as this were
regarded as supremely important. An entire theology was implicated and there
fore God’s will on earth. To have allowed other persuasions to flourish without
resistance would have been to abandon one’s own deepest convictions to do
God’s work. It would also have seriously endangered one’s own soul. Martin
Luther’s (perhaps apocryphal) reply to his inquisitors deserves quoting in full;
“Here I stand, I can do no other. It is not safe for a man to violate his conscience.
God help me.” Nor was it only theological doctrine that divided English Protes
tants. The ways in which they thought churches should be governed or precisely
how one should worship also sometimes led to persecution and bloodshed.
Many who hate and despise each other strike even outsiders as pervasively dif
ferent: different in race, ethnicity, language, religion, metaphysical commitments.
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kinship systems, aesthetic sensibilities, sexual practices, and customs. Christian
Serbs and Muslim Kosovar Albanians, for example, differ in religion, ethnicity,
and language, as do Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. Class and
caste distinctions also lead to bitter antagonisms. These kinds of deep and often
divisive differences are neither new nor rare. Modem weaponry coupled with an
cient savagery, however, can make them especially bratal when they empt in vi
olence, though machetes remain bratally effective.
Why difference, whether trivial or substantial, should make such a difference
in how we see and act is deeply puzzling. Many answers suggest themselves, but
none is fully convincing. Further, there is no reason to expect that there will be a
single answer or even one set of interrelated answers, however intellectually sat
isfying that might be. One explanation is the apparent need of many in-groups to
define themselves against an out-group: “We are ‘we’ because we differ from
‘you’.’’ The more we resemble you, the greater the need to find some differences,
however seemingly trivial, to distinguish ourselves and justify ourselves as
distinctive—and superior. But why the need to feel superior?
“The nonidentity of discemibles’’ entails that, given any two things, there must
be some discernible difference between them, or there would not be two things,
only one. It trivially follows that if we speak of Serbs and Croats, Baptists and
Methodists, Tutsis and Hutus, straight and gay, and so on, there will be dis
cernible differences. These can be, again, especially from the outside, exceed
ingly small: Tutsi and Hutu, for instance. Yet, whether great or small, discerned
differences can drive deep wedges between communities. Each looks across the
gap separating them with suspicion, fear, and anger that can explode in violence.
Yet we also know that widely divergent groups have lived in peace and har
mony for generations, even in places now tom apart by mutual enmity. If any
thing, living in peace is the norm. Otherwise, the world would have been con
sumed by hatred long ago. Just as we oil squeaky wheels, so distinctions that
grow into tension and conflict catch our attention.
Deep and pervasive differences alone are, however, not enough to explain the
harm groups inflict on each other. Nor can it explain why, after generations of
peaceful coexistence, neighbors turn on each other with such viciousness. We
know, historically, which differences seem to have led to the greatest hostility,
namely, religion, race, ethnicity, gender, and customs. We do not, however, have
anything like an adequate sociological explanation of why these engender such
animosities. An “other,” as noted previously, helps define who we are in terms of
whom we are not: We are Scots, not English; Christians, not Jews; straight, not
gay. The Inuit, who were isolated from other human beings for centuries, have the
same name for themselves as for humans generally, namely, “Inuit.” There was
no human “other” to stand in contrast. The mechanism of defining oneself in
terms of others, however, is not well understood. Although speculative explana
tory theories abound, none has garnered widespread support. Fortunately, finding
answers to what causes perceived differences to become transformed into sources
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of hatred belongs more to the social sciences than to philosophy, though philoso
phers have speculated endlessly about it.
Whether the differences among warring groups are slight or great, the degree
of animosity in the world remains high. Whether it is higher or lower than before
the end of the Cold War is difficult to say. Some suggest that the two superpow
ers kept ethnic, cultural, and racial hatreds in check, preventing them from
spilling over into violence. This might explain peace in Yugoslavia under Tito.
Elsewhere, however, the superpowers were only too happy to stir up trouble, as
in Africa and Southeast Asia. Undeniably, however, bigotry, narrow-mindedness,
fanaticism, and prejudice pervade today’s world. A catalog of differences fester
ing into malice in the United States alone could itself fill a book. Even when the
enmity has not turned violent—and it has done that often enough—it has crippled
the targets of hatred and society as a whole. One could compile lists for nation
after nation, community after community. Everywhere there are pleas for recon
ciliation and—where that fm\%—toleration and tolerance.
While we need research to find out what causes contempt and hatred between
various groups and what allows them to reconcile and live together harmoniously,
the need for toleration (the act of tolerating) and for tolerance (the attitude or
virtue)' will not thereby disappear. Simply knowing what causes what does not
mean that we can control the causes. Bare toleration will sometimes be all we can
expect—or should want. No one wishes to live in a homogeneous or lobotomized
world, a world without difference, passion, and commitment. Yet we think it is
reasonable to expect, even demand, that individuals and diverse groups^ at least
tolerate each other.
But, we quickly add, not tolerate all differences. It would be unreasonableworse, utterly wrong—to demand that we should tolerate every divergent attitude,
belief, or practice. No one, we think, should tolerate cruelty or slavery just be
cause it happens at a comfortable remove. Can we not say the same about racist,
sexist, and homophobic attitudes? We should not aspire to exchange unthinking
bigotry for mindless toleration of everything.
We therefore need to sort out what tolerance implies, the circumstances in
which it arises as a live option, and when it is (and is not) defensible, for under
standing the limits of tolerance is part of understanding the scope of its justifica
tion. So far, tolerance has resisted any consistent or agreed-on analysis and de
fense. It has proven to be—as the subtitle of an excellent anthology on it
implies—“an elusive virtue.”^ One contributor calls it highly “paradoxical.”'* An
other goes so far as to say that it is “an impossible virtue.”^
Tolerance and toleration appear elusive not only because of their apparent im
possibility but also because of their apparently inherent instability. Tolerance
seems to occupy a no-man’s-land between intolerance on the one hand and com
plete acceptance on the other. That is, it seems to exist in an unstable moment like
that between the point at which, when looking at the familiar duck/rabbit draw
ing, we can only see the duck and then, in the blink of an eye, can only see the
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rabbit. Tolerance seems equally unstable, equally fleeting. It either collapses back
into intolerance or swiftly moves to acceptance or at least indifference. In the Re
public, Socrates says of opinion that it rolls around between ignorance and
knowledge, being neither one nor the other and impossible to pin down. Toler
ance seems like that. We simply cannot seem to make it stand still long enough
to pin it down.
Nor does everyone accept that tolerance is a good thing, and certainly not that
it should be elevated to the status of a virtue, that is, as a morally desirable char
acter trait. Some think that tolerance either requires or leads us to become skep
tics, doubters, or indifferent spectators to our own lives. Someone who did not suf
fer from doubt was the French priest, then bishop, Jacques Bossuet (1627-1704).
In 1598, the Edict of Nantes granted Protestants in France the right to worship
openly. When it was revoked in 1685, Protestant pastors were forced to renounce
their calling or face severe punishment, including death. Bossuet gave a classic de
fense of intolerance in threatening the Protestant clergy: “I have the right to per
secute you,” he said, “because I am right and you are wrong.”® There is no lack of
certainty or indifference here, and that, some critics say, is a good thing, for toler
ance, they argue eats away at the very things that give our lives meaning and sub
stance. If tolerance is a good at all, it pertains only to the small, insignificant things
in life. It will otherwise sap the strength of our deepest convictions.
Others reject tolerance because it does not go far enough. It is a half measure
for the powerful and arrogant, who preach tolerance provided that they—and they
alone—decide who and what to tolerate. What we need to do, these critics say, is
move beyond tolerance and toleration to respect and positive appreciation of deep
differences, to recognize and celebrate difference. For this to happen, however,
we will have to move beyond the pretensions of contemporary liberal thought
with its emphasis on individualism, rights, means-end rationality, and selves
emptied of all meaning but that which they can provide on their own. We must
move to a new, perhaps postmodern, sensibility.
If tolerance is not universally celebrated as a virtue or attitude, neither is toler
ation universally recommended as an act or practice. If we truly believe that our
own way of life is best, why should we tolerate—that is, put up with—inferior,
maybe corrupt, ways? Champions of toleration themselves do not show forbear
ance to absolutely everything. They, too, draw lines. They just draw them at dif
ferent places. The language of tolerance and toleration, critics conclude, simply
masks different judgments about where those lines should be drawn.
This is an essay in social and political philosophy. I will, therefore, largely ig
nore questions of tolerance arising in interpersonal relations. I will occasionally
use examples drawn from this sphere because of their familiarity. Clearly, this is
possible only if we deploy the notions of tolerance and intolerance in similar
ways. I believe that we do. Nor is this surprising, for interpersonal moral reflec
tion and social and political reflections are not radically discontinuous, though
there are important differences of focus and emphasis. Justice and rights generally
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figure less prominently in interpersonal affairs than in social and political ones,
while boorish or insensitive behavior figure less importantly in social and politi
cal affairs than in interpersonal ones.
This is not to say that considerations in one sphere are absent from the other. In
our personal relations, we are often as deeply concerned about the social and po
litical attitudes of people we know well as we are of their actions. We may find it
difficult, for instance, to sustain a friendship with someone whom we know har
bors bigoted thoughts or expresses racial antipathy even if he never otherwise acts
on his thoughts and antipathy. Politically speaking, this may be largely (though not
completely) beneath notice; in our personal interactions, it looms large.
Philosophers only interpret the world, Marx famously says, adding that the
point is to change it. That philosophers only interpret the world means no more
than that they are doing their job. They are ill-equipped to do more and are likely
to make a mess of things when they try. Gaining a better philosophical under
standing of appeals to tolerance may help us understand both the possibilities and
the limits of intelligent change.
Philosophers introduce novel terms or ideas into public discourse at their peril;
usually, they work with words, phrases, and notions already in use. They shape
and refine existing currency, both old and new, and return them brightly polished
to contemporary service as if freshly minted. This does not mean that philoso
phers simply tidy up ordinary language. They also systematically explore not
only the linguistic conditions for a term’s application but also its connections with
related concepts. The aim is not dictionary making but conceptual clarification
and understanding. Sometimes a philosopher can transform our understanding of
the meaning, implications, and justifications for ready-at-hand terms. This might
mean taking a word or phrase already in use and giving it a more central place in
our thinking. Or it might mean reshaping language and so what we think. Words
then take on new meaning and importance.
Most words in ordinary language (or even learned discourse, such as medieval
Latin) do not have a precise sense, unless someone deliberately assigns one.
Many words, especially those that do not name common objects (and even here
the exceptions abound), are marked by ambiguity and vagueness, at least until
they are used in a specific context. This is both understandable and unproblem
atic. Words are tools. We do things with them. Provided that they get the job done,
we are not always too fussy about giving them a precise sense. Just as we use
screwdrivers as levers and as punches, so we use ordinary words in a variety of
ways, usually connected but often straying from their original employment. If it
matters, we can always assign a word or phrase an exact sense, as we do in sci
ence, mathematics, and certain phrases in legal contracts. Often, however, it does
not matter, and we get on perfectly well without precise definitions.
Context often removes ambiguity and vagueness. When engineers discuss “tol
erances” of a particular fitting, for instance, we are not thrown into hopeless con
fusion. This example illustrates an important point, for in a eertain context, a
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word that might be vague or generally ambiguous can have a precise meaning.
The danger lies only in thinking that it always has the same precise sense in all
contexts. We need to remind ourselves, moreover, that we simply do not always
need precision. Everyone can distinguish day from night and dusk from both, but
is there unanimity about when dusk begins and ends? And how, precisely, does
dusk differ from twilight? Everything just said is true of the word “tolerance.” As
we will see in chapter 6, it has been around a long time.

NOTES
1. I will distinguish these terms more finely in chapter 3. Usually, however, they can be
used interchangeably because the context makes clear which is meant.
2. “Groups” is not a happy word choice. I use it to refer to varied social groupings, such
as families, communities, ethnic groups, castes, religions, political parties, pressure
groups, unions, and the state. It would be tedious to provide this list, or portions of it, re
peatedly. A group, incidentally, need not be institutionalized, as will be discussed later.
3. See the collection of essays in David Heyd, ed.. Toleration: An Elusive Virtue
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
4. John Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue,” in Toleration, ed. Heyd, 28^3.
5. Bernard Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?” in Toleration, ed. Heyd,
18-27.
6. Quoted in Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic High
lands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), 7.

